The Three C\u27s of Jurisdiction Over Human Rights Claims in U.S. Courts by Keitner, Chimène I.
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Volume 113
2015
The Three C's of Jurisdiction Over Human Rights
Claims in U.S. Courts
Chimène I. Keitner
UC Hastings
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons,
and the Transnational Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review First Impressions by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation





THE THREE C’S OF JURISDICTION OVER HUMAN 
RIGHTS CLAIMS IN U.S. COURTS 
Chimène I. Keitner* 
Introduction 
The legal aftermath of the Holocaust continues to unfold in U.S. courts. 
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit dismissed claims against the Hungarian 
national railway and Hungarian national bank for World War II-era crimes 
against Hungarian Jews on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not exhausted 
available local remedies in Hungary or provided a “legally compelling” 
reason for not doing so.1 More broadly, heated debates about the role of U.S. 
courts in enforcing international human rights law have not abated since the 
Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
which restricted but did not eliminate federal jurisdiction over violations of 
certain well-established rules of international law.2 
In doctrinal terms, debates about the proper role of U.S. courts in 
transnational human rights cases have focused on whether “universal civil 
jurisdiction” exists over the most egregious forms of internationally 
wrongful conduct.3 This Essay urges courts and scholars to resist this all-or-
nothing approach. Instead, we should conceptualize the transnational 
enforcement of human rights norms as part of an emerging regime of 
“bounded universality” delineated by three basic principles: consensus on 
conduct, connection to the forum, and complementarity (“the three c’s”). 
Descriptively, viewing human rights litigation through the lens of 
bounded universality reveals that the current role of U.S. courts is both 
narrower than some advocates might like and broader than some critics 
allege. Normatively, using the three c’s as a touchstone for the assertion of 
U.S. jurisdiction over human rights claims arising in other countries can 
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 1. Fischer v. Magyar Államvasutak Zrt., Nos. 13–3073 & 14–1319, 2015 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 1092 (7th Cir., Jan. 23, 2015). 
 2. See 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013); see also Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 607–09 
(2013). 
 3. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising Death of Universal Jurisdiction 
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 835 (2013). 
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help strike a balance between concerns about U.S. legal imperialism, on the 
one hand, and providing a safe haven for human rights violators, on the 
other. The rest of this Essay illustrates how the three c’s have been, and can 
be, invoked to delineate this middle ground. 
I. Consensus on Conduct 
International law identifies several bases upon which nation-states can 
legitimately prescribe conduct-regulating rules. Not surprisingly, the two 
main bases are territory (the location of the conduct) and nationality (the 
citizenship of the actor).4 But as the American Law Institute’s Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law recognizes, prescriptive jurisdiction may 
reach conduct that does not have one of these traditional links to the 
regulating state if “the community of nations” has recognized that conduct 
as being “of universal concern.”5 Accordingly, countries may prescribe rules 
defining and punishing conduct “such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or 
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of 
terrorism, even where none of the [other] bases of jurisdiction . . . is 
present.”6 The Restatement specifies that, although universal jurisdiction to 
prescribe has generally been exercised in the form of criminal law, 
“international law does not preclude the application of non-criminal law on 
this basis, for example, by providing a remedy in tort or restitution for 
victims of piracy.”7 
Transnational (or “horizontal”) enforcement of human rights norms by 
domestic courts can be conceptualized as an exercise of jurisdiction to 
prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, or both.8 The scope of a particular 
domestic court’s authority to adjudicate claims for extraterritorial harm 
caused by a violation of universally recognized norms depends on the 
relevant national legislative authorization, as well as applicable limits under 
domestic and international law. In the United States, the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS), a provision in the 1789 Judiciary Act, provides federal courts with 
jurisdiction over civil actions for “a tort only, committed in violation of the 
 
 4. REST. (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. b (1987). The American Law 
Institute, of which the author is a member, is currently in the process of revisiting these 
provisions with the goal of producing a Fourth Restatement. 
 5. Id. § 404. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. § 404 cmt. b. 
 8. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Transnational Litigation: Jurisdiction and Immunities, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Dinah Shelton ed., 
2013); William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction Fallacy, 51 
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 35, 38–44 (2010). 
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law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”9 Absent clarification by 
Congress, the task of interpreting this provision has fallen to courts. 
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court adopted an approach to 
ATS jurisdiction based on the degree of consensus proscribing the alleged 
misconduct—the first of the three c’s.10 The majority constructed a 
benchmark for consensus based on the degree of specificity and universality 
that characterized the eighteenth-century prohibitions on piracy, offenses 
against ambassadors, and violations of safe conducts. It then held that the 
ATS authorizes judges to create a common law cause of action for violations 
of those international law norms that exhibit the requisite degree of 
specificity and universality—in other words, the requisite degree of 
consensus. 
The majority in Sosa focused on the nature of the alleged misconduct, 
not its location. Because the arbitrary detention alleged in Sosa was not 
prolonged, the majority found that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. The territorial scope of jurisdiction 
under the ATS, which had been briefed,11 was not specifically addressed by 
the Court. 
The Sosa standard focuses on the degree of substantive consensus 
regarding the prohibited conduct. Such consensus can manifest itself in the 
form of treaties, which express states’ explicit consent, or customary 
international law, consisting of near-uniform state practice accompanied by 
a belief that such practice is legally required. Although using an eighteenth-
century benchmark for the required degree of consensus seems somewhat 
convoluted (if perhaps justifiable in doctrinal terms for a 1789 statute), the 
basic idea that horizontal enforcement presupposes a significant degree of 
substantive agreement on conduct-regulating rules makes sense. The greater 
the degree of consensus, the less international opposition horizontal 
enforcement is likely to provoke,12 and the less susceptible a country will be 
to charges that it is imposing its own idiosyncratic view of acceptable 
conduct on the rest of the world. 
 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 10. 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
 11. See Brief for Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), 2004 WL 
182582 at *27–*41; Nicholas W. Van Aelstyn & William S. Dodge, Brief of Professors of Federal 
Jurisdiction and Legal History As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 99, 116–17 (2004). 
 12. Accord Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (“[T]he 
greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international 
law, the more appropriate it is for [a domestic] judiciary to render decisions regarding it.”). 
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II. Connection to the Forum 
Consensus on conduct has not proved sufficient, on its own, to quell 
concerns about potential legislative and judicial overreaching. Consequently, 
it is a long-standing principle that controversies must have some connection 
to the forum state in order to warrant a court’s exercise of adjudicatory 
jurisdiction. In the United States, this intuition has been implemented in 
part through judicial interpretations of the “due process” requirement of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
The Supreme Court has not, however, left “due process” to do all the 
work in transnational cases brought under the ATS. This became clear in 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, a case involving civil claims brought 
against a foreign corporation for aiding and abetting the Nigerian military in 
internationally unlawful attacks on civilians.13 The question ultimately 
decided in Kiobel was whether a claim brought under the ATS “may reach 
conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign,”14 even assuming 
that the conduct was performed by an individual or entity that subsequently 
came within the personal jurisdiction of a U.S. court.15 
The shift toward a territorial focus in Kiobel—prompted by a question 
issued by the Court sua sponte16—evidences a resurgence of geographically-
based reasoning in the Court’s approach to defining the reach of its remedial 
powers. This focus is captured by the second “c,” connection, which has been 
invoked to circumscribe the exercise of both prescriptive (legislative) and 
adjudicative (judicial) jurisdiction. For example, in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank, the Court determined that section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 does not provide a cause of action to “foreign plaintiffs 
suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with 
securities traded on foreign exchanges.”17 The Court found that it had 
subject matter jurisdiction, but that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim 
because section 10(b) does not prohibit conduct overseas. In international 
law terms, the Morrison Court determined that Congress had not exercised 
its prescriptive jurisdiction to reach conduct outside U.S. territory. 
 
 13. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013). 
 14. Id. at 1664. 
 15. After Kiobel, the Supreme Court continued its trend of tightening up standards for 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over multinational corporations domiciled outside of the 
United States. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (finding, in an ATS case, 
that California does not have general jurisdiction over a German company for claims relating 
to conduct engaged in by its Argentinian subsidiary). 
 16. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (Mar. 5, 2012) (reargument 
order). 
 17. 561 U.S. 247, 247 (2010). 
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Because the ATS does not itself prohibit conduct, it seems odd to 
analogize it to the statute at issue in Morrison. But that is what the Kiobel 
majority did, by applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the 
judicial creation of a cause of action under the ATS,18 thereby curbing the 
remedial reach of this jurisdictional statute. 
Whether the majority’s opinion allows judges to create causes of action 
for Sosa-qualifying conduct occurring exclusively in the territory of a foreign 
sovereign remains contested. The somewhat cryptic fourth part of the 
majority’s opinion, coupled with a brief concurrence by Justice Kennedy 
(who supplied the fifth vote), provides that judges may still create causes of 
action under the ATS for claims that “touch and concern the territory of the 
United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.”19 
Four justices concurred in the judgment of dismissal but not in the 
majority’s rationale. In an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, these justices 
stated that “just as we have looked to established international substantive 
norms to help determine the statute’s substantive reach [in Sosa], so we 
should look to international jurisdictional norms to help determine the 
statute’s jurisdictional scope.”20 This internationalist approach echoes points 
Justice Breyer made in his opinion for the Court in F. Hoffmann-La Roche 
Ltd. v. Empagran, in which he indicated that “constru[ing] ambiguous 
statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of 
other nations . . . . reflects principles of customary international law.”21 
In Kiobel, Justice Breyer would have recognized three scenarios in which 
the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction (by creating a federal common law cause of 
action) would be appropriate under the ATS: the first based on the principle 
of territoriality (if the tort occurred on American soil), the second based on 
the principle of nationality (if the defendant is an American national), and 
the third based on U.S. national interest, including “a distinct interest in 
preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as 
well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of 
 
 18. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
 19. Id. at 1668. Based on the Court’s reasoning, some federal courts have dismissed ATS 
claims when the injurious conduct occurred abroad. See, e.g., Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 
F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2013) (“In all cases, therefore the ATS does not permit claims based on 
illegal conduct that occurred entirely in the territory of another sovereign.”); but cf. Mwani v. 
Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that an ATS suit resulting from bombing of 
the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi could proceed under the ATS); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier 
Tech., 2014 WL 2922840 (4th Cir. June 30, 2014) (holding that a claim against a U.S. 
corporation executing a contract with the U.S. government was sufficient to displace the 
presumption). 
 20. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 21. 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004). 
72 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 113:67 
 
 
mankind.”22 To the extent that the universality principle is premised on a 
shared international interest in promoting accountability regardless of an 
alleged perpetrator’s geographic location, Justice Breyer’s third scenario is 
consistent with the rationale for universal jurisdiction, manifested here as 
support for a bounded version of universality. 
Both the majority and concurring opinions situate U.S. courts within a 
global network of courts, but from different perspectives. The majority 
resists interpretations of the ATS that would “make the United States a 
uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms.”23 
The concurrence, by contrast, emphasizes the importance of not “harboring 
‘common enemies of all mankind.’ ”24 These remarks illustrate judicial 
awareness that U.S. courts form part of a transnational legal system in which 
claimants and defendants may cross geographic borders in search of both 
redress and refuge. Individual judges’ views of which vision is more 
troubling—providing a haven for plaintiffs or a haven for perpetrators—may 
make them more or less receptive to competing accounts of Congress’s 
intent in enacting statutes such as the ATS. 
Whereas Sosa emphasized consensus on conduct, Kiobel emphasized 
connection to the forum state. From the perspective of a bounded 
universality approach, the consensus and connection requirements could be 
assessed on a sliding scale, such that the degree of connection required 
(beyond the threshold needed to assert personal jurisdiction) might 
appropriately be viewed more flexibly in cases involving alleged conduct that 
indisputably meets or exceeds the Sosa standard of universality and 
specificity. Conversely, a court might appropriately refuse to create a cause 
of action where the conduct-regulating norm at issue does not fall squarely 
within the Sosa rationale, and the connection between the claim and the 
United States is only marginally greater than it was in Kiobel. An excessively 
rigid application of the Kiobel standard in cases alleging universally 
proscribed conduct, such as piracy, slavery, or genocide, could deprive 
plaintiffs of a forum that international law would consider unobjectionable. 
III. Complementarity 
The Supreme Court has not addressed definitively whether prudential or 
mandatory exhaustion of local remedies applies to ATS claims; by contrast, 
the Torture Victim Protection Act, which provides a cause of action for 
torture and extrajudicial killing committed under color of foreign law, does 
 
 22. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 23. Id. at 1668. 
 24. Id. at 1672–73 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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require exhaustion of “adequate and available remedies in the place in which 
the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”25 The international law 
principle of exhaustion has operated vertically between domestic courts and 
international tribunals, such as the European Court of Human Rights.26 
Similarly, the International Criminal Court (ICC) exercises its jurisdiction 
on the basis of complementarity, meaning that states with jurisdiction have 
priority in adjudicating cases over which the ICC has concurrent 
jurisdiction.27 
Some consideration of the principle of complementarity—the third “c”—
also makes sense in the context of horizontal enforcement of international 
law by other states. A U.S. court should be more willing to adjudicate claims 
for international law violations when there is little chance of meaningful 
redress in the courts of other countries with a greater connection to the 
claims, a principle also reflected in forum non conveniens doctrine. The 
complementarity principle informed the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in 
Fischer, which reiterates the court’s earlier holding (invoking the principle of 
vertical complementarity) that “domestic remedies for expropriation [must] 
be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted.”28 The 
Seventh Circuit appropriately emphasized that “[i]f plaintiffs choose to 
pursue their claims in Hungary but find the way barred by inaction or 
hostility, the U.S. courts may be available to consider their claims.”29 
This emerging principle of “horizontal complementarity” can help 
allocate adjudicatory authority among domestic tribunals with an 
overlapping interest in transnational disputes. That said, like the c’s of 
consensus and connection, complementarity should not pose an 
insurmountable barrier to horizontal adjudication of human rights claims by 
U.S. courts.30 
 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. 
 26. European Convention on Human Rights art. 35, June 1, 2010, 4.XI. 1950, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y89G-U659]. 
 27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 
A/CONF.183/9, http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-
0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf [http://perma.cc/96Y8-CLRG] (providing that a 
case is inadmissible if the case “is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution.”). 
 28. Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 679 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 29. Id. at 682. 
 30. See, e.g., William Dodge, International Comity Run Amok, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 3, 
2013, 9:22 AM), http://justsecurity.org/19640/international-comity-run-amok/ 
[http://perma.cc/JMM3-FRA8] (criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s recent articulation of a broad 
and unsupported principle of “international comity abstention”). 




Under a bounded universality approach to jurisdiction, claims involving 
foreign parties and foreign conduct are suitable for adjudication in U.S. 
courts if they have an appropriate combination of consensus on conduct, 
connection to the forum, and due regard for complementarity. Under this 
regime, a claim presenting a very high degree of substantive agreement on 
the applicable conduct-regulating rule, a connection to the forum sufficient 
for personal jurisdiction purposes, and little chance of meaningful recovery 
abroad would be suitable for adjudication in U.S. courts; whereas a claim 
presenting only a moderate degree of substantive agreement and tangential 
connections to the forum would not be suitable. 
As Robert Cover reminds us, “every denial of jurisdiction on the part of 
a court is an assertion of the power to determine jurisdiction and thus to 
constitute a norm.”31 In a world of bounded universality, territorial borders 
play an important role—but they are not, and should not be, the sole 




 31. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 n.23 
(1983). 
